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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Machine Corp."16 and the restrictive
view of Channel Excavators Inc. v. Amato Landscaping Corp."2 7 Sea-
man espoused the principle that CPLR 3213 is satisfied if the plaintiff
can establish a prima facie case by proof of the instrument and of non-
payment in accordance with its terms; 118 Channel held that the use of
CPLR 3213 is precluded where proof of facts outside the instrument is
necessary to determine the action. 1 9
Brickman v. Niagara Fruit Co. 120 is in accord with Seaman. Plain-
tiff sued on a written account stated, proving the instrument and defen-
dant's non-payment. Defendant raised no factual issues, basing his
defense on the contention that the account stated did not constitute
"an instrument for the payment of money only." The Supreme Court,
Albany County, concluded that a written and undenied account stated
is encompassed under CPLR 3213.121 No citation or rationale for this
determination was given in the opinion.
The most notable aspect of Brickman is its support of Seaman. 22
Under the extrinsic proof standard applied in Channel, use of CPLR
3213 would not have been sustained. 23 The "simple, direct and time
and expense saving procedure"'124 in CPLR 3213 should be administered
liberally in accordance with the mandate of CPLR 104. For realization
of this goal, a general principle to determine what instruments qualify
for this summary treatment must be established, to avoid the wasteful
process of case-by-case determination and to end conflict in the area.
CPLR 3213: Section encompasses notes payable "with interest at bank
rates."
Summary treatment of "an action.., based on an instrument for
the payment of money only" is authorized under CPLR 3213. The
Erie County 1970); Baker v. Gundermann, 52 Misc. 2d 639, 276 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966) with, e.g., Signal Plan, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 23 App. Div.
2d 636, 256 N.Y.S.2d 866 (1st Dep't 1965) (mem.); All-o-Matic Mfg. Corp. v. Shields, 59
Misc. 2d 199, 298 N.Y.S.2d 268 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1969); Louis Sherry Ice Cream
Co. v. Kroggel, 42 Misc. 2d 21, 245 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1963).
116 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 295 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 44 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 313, 335-38 (1969).
117 48 Misc. 2d 429, 264 N.YS.2d 987 (Sup. CL Nassau County 1968).
118 31 App. Div. 2d at 137, 295 N.Y.S2d at 754.
119 48 Misc. 2d at 430, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 988-89.
120 65 Misc. 2d 483, 318 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1971).
121 Id. at 484. 318 N.Y.S.2d at 260.
122 Professor Siegel considers Seaman "the most coherent standard yet rendered for
determining what kind of instrument satisfies CPLR 3213." 7B MCKIsNNE's CPLR 3213,
supp. commentary 4 at 20 (1970).
23 Of course, proof of an account stated goes beyond the instrument itself, for
transactions prior to the date of the statement determine whether it is an account stated.
124 Paul v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 683, 685, 265 N.Y.S.2d 687, 689 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County 1965).
[Vol. 46:147
SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
courts have had some difficulty in determining which instruments are
eligible for this facile procedure, since the Legislature did not define
or enumerate.125 It has been held, however, that a non-negotiable in-
strument which includes "a clear, unequivocal, unconditional promise
for the payment of money only,"' 28 falls within the scope of CPLR
3213.127 Does such an instrument still qualify if there are any facts
which must be established outside the instrument?
In A. Alport & Son, Inc. v. Hotel Evans, Inc.,12 the Supreme
Court, Sullivan County, held that two notes payable "with interest at
bank rates" were proper predicates under CPLR 3213.129 The only
facts requiring proof beyond the face of the notes were the respective
interest rates. The court believed that this type of extrinsic evidence
should not prevent summary judgment. 1 0 It should be noted that the
cases which the Alport court cited in support of its decision' 1' did not
explicitly acknowledge acceptance of extrinsic evidence, and that some
restated the rule that no proof dehors the instrument would be per-
mitted in a 3213 motion. 3 2
The Alport decision is laudable. The facts requiring proof dehors
the instrument were (1) merely necessary to determine the precise
amount for which judgment should be given and not essential to prove
agreement to pay interest per se, and (2) readily ascertainable. The
stringent Channel view, 133 which precludes use of CPLR 3213 where
proof of facts outside the instrument is required to determine the
action, is rejected in favor of a practical attitude. The Alport court
seeks to formalize a previously unspoken exception to a too stringent
125 See 4 WK&.M 8213.02a.
126 Instituto Per Lo Sviluppo Economico Dell 'Italia Meridionale v. Sperti Prods., Inc.,
47 F.R.D. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
127 Louis Sherry Ice Cream Co. v. Kroggel, 42 Misc. 2d 21, 245 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1968).
128 65 Misc. 2d 374, 317 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County 1970).
129 Id. at 876-77, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 989-40, citing seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach.
Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 1386, 295 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1st Dep't 1968); Koegel v. Birnbaum, 27
App. Div. 2d 653, 278 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 19 N.Y.2d 896, 227 N.-2d 887, 281
N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967); Wagner v. Cornblum, 62 Misc. 2d 161, 808 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1970); Paul v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 688, 265 N.YS.2d 687 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
County), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 1054, 265 N.Y.S.2d 625 (8d Dep't 1965).
130 65 Misc. 2d at 376, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 939.
131 See note 5 supra.
132 Seaman-Andwall Corp. v. Wright Mach. Corp., 31 App. Div. 2d 136, 137, 295
N.YS.2d 752, 754 (1st Dep't 1968); Paul v. Weiss, 48 Misc. 2d 688, 689, 265 N.Y.S.2d
687, 693 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan County), aff'd, 24 App. Div. 2d 1054, 265 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sd
Dep't 1965).
133Channel Excavators Inc. v. Amato Landscaping Corp., 48 Misc. 2d 429, 264
N.Y.S.2d 987 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968); see 7B McKINNEY's CPLR 8218, commentary
3 at 830 (1970).
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rule.18 4 The need of extrinsic proof should not necessarily bar invoca-
tion of CPLR 3213.
CPLR 3215(c): Default not equivalent to admission of allegations of
complaint.
CPLR 3215(c) provides that a plaintiff must seek entry of judg-
ment within one year after default or see the complaint dismissed as
abandoned unless said plaintiff shows sufficient reason why the court
should not so dismiss.135 The purpose of this section is to prevent plain-
tiffs from unreasonably delaying termination of their actions. 136
In Ballard v. Billings & Spencer Co. 37 plaintiff secured restoration
of this action to the trial calendar by falsely stating that all pleadings
had been served. At the time defendants United and Houdaille had
been in default for more than one year, but plaintiff's conduct indicated
that he had expected them to serve their answers eventually. While a
jury was being selected, defendants learned that plaintiff intended to
treat their failures to answer as admissions of the complaints' allega-
tions. Plaintiff refused to accept proposed answers, and the trial court,
exasperated by the defendants' dilatoriness, denied their motions to
serve answers and for mistrial and directed trial of the issue of damages
only.138 Defendants appealed inter alia the court's denial of their mo-
tions to serve answers.
The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, ruled that denial
of the motions was an abuse of discretion and ordered a new trial.13 9
Express limiting statutory provisions thwarted the trial court's attempt
to punish defendant's failure to move to vacate the note of issue in-
cluding a certificate of readiness stating that all pleadings had been
served by equating default with admission of complaint.140 Plaintiff
could not circumvent CPLR 3215(c). 141 Plaintiff suffered no legal prej-
udice by the default, for he was aware of defendants' positions, and
in fact waived the default. Since the law prefers disposition of cases
134Accord, Instituto Per Lo Sviluppo Economico Dell 'Italia Meridionale v. Sperti
Prods., Inc., 47 F.R.D. 310, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
135 see 7B McKlNNEY'S CPLR 3215, commentaries 11-13 (1970); 4 WK&M J 3215.13-
3215.16.
1386 See 4 WK&M 3012.09.
'37 36 App. Div. 2d 71, 319 N.Y.S.2d 191 (4th Dep't 1971).
1381d. at 73-75, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 193-95.
139 Id. at 76, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 197.
140 See DeRosa v. La Sala, 31 App. Div. 2d 745, 297 N.Y.S.2d 483 (2d Dep't 1969);
Herzbrun v. Levine, 23 App. Div. 2d 744, 259 N.Y.S.2d 237 (Ist Dep't 1965); Kohn v. Kohn,
5 Misc. 2d 288, 158 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1957); 4 WK&M 3012.09;
3215.13-3215.14 (1969).
141 36 App. Div. 2d at 75, 319 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
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